← Every exhibit
The quota-parent matrix
An attainment result is interpretable only when its opportunity set, work allocation, incentive timing, relationship, capacity, and measurement boundary are visible.
| Parent to test | What can move | Observable test | What remains unproven without it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Opportunity and coverage | Reachable accounts, buying windows, territory load, assignment | Same account or territory set, opportunity definition, coverage load, and account transitions | A lower percentage is a representative-quality result |
| Lead quality and allocation | Usable demand, routing, response work, competing lead types | Qualification status, source, disposition, response time, and time allocation by work type | More leads created more comparable opportunity |
| Incentive and timing | Effort, price, credit, deal timing, period-end composition | Thresholds, credit rules, fiscal window, approval path, and timing distribution | The period result is neutral to the plan |
| Relationship continuity | Resale, new sale, trust, account ownership, buying contact | Owner change, relationship state, resale versus new-sale split, and contact continuity | The current owner caused the change in revenue |
| Capacity and ramp | Available selling time, onboarding, handoffs, internal load | Comparable selling time, ramp stage, account load, and non-selling work | The target was achievable from the measured capacity |
| Measurement boundary | Numerator, denominator, currency, credit, recognition rule | Target version, credit date, currency treatment, product and revenue definition | Two attainment percentages are comparable |
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Reference & Evidence
Source: Author's framework grounded in Oyer (1998), Sabnis et al. (2013), Shi et al. (2017), Schmitz et al. (2020), and Palmatier et al. (2007). The studies have different units, designs, and outcomes; the matrix is not a quota scorecard.
Each line is a claim from the register this journal publishes against, resolved from the register at build time.
- A Nonlinear pay gives salespeople and executives "incentive to manipulate prices, influence the timing of customer purchases, and vary effort over their firms' fiscal years" oyer-1998-fiscal-year-ends ·
OYER98-C1 - A The seasonality result, in the author's words: "I find that fiscal-year timing influences the seasonality of business in most manufacturing" industries, identified because "I can separately identify the calendar and fiscal-year seasonality of revenue and prices" oyer-1998-fiscal-year-ends ·
OYER98-C2 - A The panel, verbatim: "A total of 31,936 quarterly observations are available, covering 981 manufacturers", and the data "cover firms' 1985 to 1993 fiscal years" oyer-1998-fiscal-year-ends ·
OYER98-C4 - A The author bounds his own result: "This analysis is not meant to determine the optimal compensation plan, to esti"mate structural parameters or to establish an indisputable causal relationship, and "the evidence on the link between incentive contracts and fiscal-year effects is circum"stantial oyer-1998-fiscal-year-ends ·
OYER98-C5 - A The sample, from the paper: "we received 562 surveys for a response rate of" 21.08%, "we retained 500 usable responses", and the analysis uses "data from 461 sales reps from four firms". The 70% in the same abstract is guarded by FUN-X1 and never travels with this row Sabnis et al. (2013) ·
SCCL13-C1 - A The compensation context, verbatim: "The compensation schemes in all four firms were based primarily on quota achievement, commissions, and bonuses for top-line sales", and "no component explicitly rewarded following up on marketing leads" Sabnis et al. (2013) ·
SCCL13-C2 - A "the proportion of time that sales reps devote to marketing leads depends on organizational lead prequalification and managerial tracking processes", alongside motivation, lead volume, experience and ability Sabnis et al. (2013) ·
SCCL13-C3 - A Managerial tracking works the wrong way round, and the authors say so: they had argued it "would signal the importance that the managers place on lead follow-up and thus increase follow-up of marketing leads; however, our results show an opposite effect", b = −.89, p < .05. Prequalification quality runs the expected way, b = .64 Sabnis et al. (2013) ·
SCCL13-C4 - A Time allocation is the mechanism: "the proportion of time that sales reps devote to marketing leads depends on organizational lead prequalification" Sabnis et al. (2013) ·
SCCL13-C5 - A The reassignment losses, verbatim: "Customers reassigned to new hires exhibited a 21.6% sales loss, and those reassigned to existing sales reps exhibited an 11.0% sales loss", and the authors report the decay too: "for new hires, 12.5% sales loss over ten quarters vs. 21.6% for one year" Shi, Sridhar, Grewal & Lilien (2017), Table 10 ·
SSGL17-C2 - A The setting carries a legal constraint that bounds every reading of the result: "A noncompete agreement prevents departing sales reps legally from taking any" customers with them if they are hired by a competitor Shi, Sridhar, Grewal & Lilien (2017), data section ·
SSGL17-C5 - A The two opposing paths, verbatim: "Data pertaining to 2,040 B2B customers of a leading European logistics company over a four-year period, implemented in a series of difference-in-differences models, reveal that relationship disruptions can decrease resale reve""nue by 28.8% but can also increase new sale revenues by 52.2%" Schmitz, Friess, Alavi & Habel (2020), Table 5 ·
SFAH20-C1 - A The total effect is the smaller of the three: "we find that customers who experience a relationship disrup""tion generate 6.8% less total revenue on average" Schmitz, Friess, Alavi & Habel (2020), Table 5 ·
SFAH20-C2 - A The positive totals are conditional, and the design is one firm: "Data pertaining to 2,040 B2B customers of a leading European logistics company over a four-year period, implemented in a series of difference-in-differences models" Schmitz, Friess, Alavi & Habel (2020), implications and Table 7 ·
SFAH20-C3 - A The design is dyadic and triadic: "In a study of 362 buyer"-"salesperson dyads using triadic data (from buyer, salesperson, and sales manager)", and the construct is new: "only salesperson-owned loyalty, a newly identified construct, directly affects the more tangible seller financial outcomes of sales growth and selling effectiveness" Palmatier, Scheer & Steenkamp (2007), Table 3 ·
PSS07-C1 - A Stated intention, and the item says its own horizon: buyers "reported that they would try to shift an average of 26% of" their current purchases, the question being whether they would "try to shift to this salesperson"'"s new rep firm over the next 3 years?" Intention, not realised movement Palmatier, Scheer & Steenkamp (2007), appendix and p. 195 ·
PSS07-C2 - A The contrast is between the two loyalties, in the authors' words: "only salesperson-owned loyalty, a newly identified construct, directly affects the more tangible seller financial outcomes of sales growth and selling effectiveness" Palmatier, Scheer & Steenkamp (2007), Table 3 ·
PSS07-C3 - A The paper reports measured firm and interface levers that alter salesperson-owned loyalty and firm-loyalty paths Palmatier, Scheer & Steenkamp (2007), Tables 3 and 4 ·
PSS07-C4 - B Quota attainment is an outcome with multiple observable parents; a verdict should separate opportunity and coverage, lead quality and allocation, incentive and timing, relationship continuity, representative capacity, and measurement boundary Author framework, stated in Brief - B03 quota attainment parents ·
B03-C1 - B Before a quota comparison is interpreted, the comparison should name the account or territory set, period, denominator, outcome definition, and the counterfactual or baseline against which the result is judged Author framework, stated in Brief - B03 quota attainment parents ·
B03-C2
Grades: A, verified against the printed page of the primary source · B, primary source, text layer only · C, authoritative secondary · D, reported.